

Colonial Crime and the Ethical Conduct of the Algerian Revolution: An Analytical Approach to the Contents of El Moudjahid Newspaper, 1956–1962

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Abstract

This study examines the role played by El Moudjahid, the official organ of the National Liberation Front (FLN), in exposing the crimes committed by French colonial authorities in Algeria, and in highlighting the humane and ethical conduct that characterized the behaviour of the National Liberation Army (ALN) toward its adversaries — in contrast to the colonial narrative that sought to distort the image of the Algerian Revolution by portraying it as a movement of indiscriminate violence. The study adopts the analytical-historical method in reading the contents of El Moudjahid and comparing them with the testimonies of other parties, French and foreign, who were contemporaries of the events of the Revolution. The analysis reveals the scale of French violations, manifested in policies of systematic arrest and torture, and in crimes of rape used as an instrument to humiliate Algerians, as well as the policy of internment camps (regroupement centres), which entrenched the economic, medical, and psychological suffering of the civilian population. By contrast, the study highlights the ethical and legal constraints to which the National Liberation Army adhered in its treatment of French prisoners, and the explicit acknowledgment, in the testimonies of those same prisoners, of the humanity of the revolutionaries — testimony that constituted a counter-document to colonial propaganda. The study concludes that El Moudjahid was not merely a media instrument of mobilization, but a documented historical witness that contributed to building the humanitarian legitimacy of the Algerian Revolution before international public opinion, through an implicit and direct comparison between the brutality of colonial practice and the revolutionaries' commitment to the values of justice and mercy drawn from both Islamic and humanitarian frames of reference.

Keywords: El Moudjahid newspaper; the Algerian Revolution; French colonialism; torture and internment camps; humanitarian legitimacy.

Introduction

The Algerian Revolution (1954–1962) constituted a turning point in the history of national liberation movements. It was not merely a military confrontation between two unequal parties, but also a struggle over narrative and legitimacy before local and international public opinion. Amid this struggle, El Moudjahid, as the official organ of the National Liberation Front, played a pivotal role in exposing the criminal practices pursued by the French occupation authorities against the Algerian people — arbitrary

arrest, systematic torture, crimes of rape, and the policy of forcibly regrouping the population into internment camps — at a time when colonial propaganda was working to portray the Algerian revolutionaries as violent and barbaric. Yet a close reading of the newspaper's contents, as well as of the testimonies of French prisoners themselves, reveals a striking paradox between the brutality of French practice and the National Liberation Army's adherence to strict ethical and legal constraints in dealing with its adversaries. This opens onto a central problem: to what extent did El Moudjahid contribute to building humanitarian and ethical legitimacy for the Algerian Revolution in the face of the colonial narrative? From this principal question a number of sub-questions arise: What was the nature of the crimes documented by El Moudjahid against Algerians during the years of the Revolution? How did the newspaper handle the issue of French prisoners and soldiers who fell into the hands of the National Liberation Army? What ethical and legal frame of reference governed the conduct of the mujahidin toward their adversaries? And to what extent did this journalistic treatment contribute to refuting the colonial narrative and constructing an alternative image of the Algerian Revolution before international public opinion?

French Colonial Crimes within Algeria

Throughout the years of its activity during the liberation revolution, El Moudjahid succeeded in confronting Algerian and international public opinion alike with the truth of the heinous criminal acts perpetrated by the French occupation authorities — systematic practices directed against the Algerian people aimed at breaking its resolve and halting the spread of the liberation tide that had spread among its ranks like wildfire. To illustrate this role, the discussion below highlights some of the journalistic activity through which El Moudjahid exposed France's crimes in Algeria.

1. The Policy of Arrest and Torture against Algerians

The French government deployed all its resources in confronting the Revolution in Algeria. It issued exceptional laws and did not hesitate to enact the state-of-emergency law, approved by the French Parliament on 31 March 1955. From the third of April 1955 onward, Algeria entered an era of arbitrary repression and a growing number of internment centres and prisons, alongside the launch of repressive measures without recourse to the French legislature.¹

Under this law, the French Minister of the Interior and the French Governor-General in Algeria were empowered to issue immediate internment orders without recourse to the judicial authorities, and to establish internment centres, pursuant to Article 6 of the law. The first such camp was established at the end of April in the Khenchela region of eastern Algeria, where around 160 Algerians were detained. These measures heralded the return of the era of internment in Algeria, which had ended with the close of the Pétain² administration during the Second World War. It should be noted here that the camps France established in Algeria underwent a steady evolution in line with the development of the Algerian Revolution: they began as a form of forced residence in the early years of the Revolution, before turning, in 1957, into camps of a far more lethal character.

Algerian internees were subjected in these camps to every form of torture and inhuman treatment. In this connection, as part of its exposure of such practices, El Moudjahid carried the testimony of one detainee held at a selection and transit centre, the mujahid Mohamed Abbas Turki, who was interned at the Beni Messous selection and transit centre. He stated: "After twenty-two days in the cells of the Hussein Dey

barracks, the military decided to transfer us to the Beni Messous centre. Treatment at this centre is extremely harsh — Algerians sleep on the ground in bitter cold and are subjected to continuous beating, interspersed from time to time with savage torture. Even the women, numbering around fifteen detainees, were not spared this harsh treatment. After a period spent at Beni Messous, we were transferred to the Paul Cazelles camp"³.

It is worth noting that the practice of torture by French forces in Algeria during the Revolution was not an individual matter; all the evidence confirms that it was a systematic and consistent policy, enjoying the direct and unmistakable support of the French government. Dr. Zoubir Rachid points to this issue with great clarity when he comments on the role played by French government officials in obscuring and concealing the facts regarding torture in Algeria during the years of the Revolution⁴. This state of affairs led Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison to pose the following question: was torture in Algeria... a limited exception during the wars of national independence?⁵ He answered his own question in the negative, considering torture to be the very rule on which French repressive policy in Algeria rested, rather than an exception⁶.

French occupation soldiers refined and developed new methods of practising torture in Algeria. This is evident in the admission of one of them concerning the multiplicity and diversity of the methods used against Algerians, when he stated: "We came to choose between this method and that according to the case before us, that is, according to the person being tortured." He added, boasting of how they exchanged opinions and observations on the most effective methods of torture for use against Algerians in order to force confessions and extract the required information, saying: "We exchange experiences of torture and show one another the most effective and efficient methods"⁷. He further stated: "Some of the torturers became creative and inventive in the field of torture and interrogation, and some even used the repugnant methods of the Middle Ages"⁸. From this admission we discover how the Algerian people became a testing ground for the various means and methods of torture which the French executioner refined in his pursuit of information that might help the French authorities crush the Algerian Revolution. El Moudjahid, the organ of the National Liberation Front, commented on these acts of torture and the enormity of the suffering endured by the Algerian people, writing: "The mind can scarcely believe that, in the twentieth century, there exists a human being who turns against his fellow man, binds his hands and feet, and nails them to fixed boards; nor can the human mind conceive of the tearing out of fingernails and teeth with pincers"⁹.

El Moudjahid pointed to some of the methods that were used extensively in the practice of torture, among them the so-called "water-hose" method, which consisted of inserting a rubber tube through the mouth of the person being interrogated and connecting it to a water source; water would then flow until the detainee's stomach was filled. The matter did not end there: the torturers would then forcefully stamp on his stomach to expel the water from his body — a criminal act that clearly indicates the extent of the psychological pressure to which the detainee was subjected, and how strong his faith in his cause must have been for him to endure this without divulging information that might harm the activities of the Algerian Revolution. One detainee, Henri Alleg¹⁰, who was tortured by this gruesome method, documented his experience, writing: "After being tied to a flat wooden board, they took me to the tap; after inserting a rubber tube into my mouth connected to it, they covered my eyes and forced my mouth

open with a piece of wood to prevent any resistance on my part to the entry of the water. Once I was ready for the torture to begin, they turned on the tap and the water began to flow; after a while the water began to come out of the openings of my body — the nose, the mouth, the anus. I felt as though I were drowning, and I fell into a state of unconsciousness that was death itself"¹¹. El Moudjahid offered a similar description to that given earlier by Henri Alleg, stating: "As for the second method by which torture is carried out with water, it involves inserting a tube through the mouth connected to a tap; when the stomach reaches its maximum distension... one of the torturers leaps and lands flat-footed upon the stomach of the tortured man, so that water spurts from his mouth and from the rest of the body's openings"¹²

Water torture was not confined to the hose method; another method used was the submersion of the detainee's head in a basin containing filthy water¹³, so as to force him to inhale water in order to compel him to confess and provide information. This method, too, was dangerous to the detainee's life, in addition to the appalling psychological effect it produced. In a letter sent by one French conscript to his family, he confirmed the use of this method by the French army, writing: "On the evening of 3 December 1956, a group of French conscripts, myself among them, were summoned by the gendarmerie to witness the torture of two Algerian detainees who had been arrested the previous evening. The first method of torture used to interrogate them was to strip them of their clothing and bind their hands and feet, after which their heads were submerged in a cistern of filthy water for a long period"¹⁴. This gruesome description closely resembled what El Moudjahid had reported, writing: "This is also carried out by means of the basin: the tortured man is made to kneel, a stick is placed beneath his knees with his arms bound under it, his knees are then tied, and he is lowered into the basin, with the ends of the stick resting on its rim, so that the victim hangs suspended by his knees from the stick as though from an axis around which he swings; his head is plunged into a filthy liquid each time he denies the charges against him"¹⁵. El Moudjahid also referred to other methods of torture, stating: "The tortured man is seated on a chair to which the torturers bind his back, his chest bared; the interrogating soldier then blows tobacco smoke into his eyes and extinguishes his lit cigarette on his chest. The victim is also bound stretched out on the torture table, his chest bared, then doused with petrol and set alight; his hands are tied behind his back and his fingernails and fingertips burned with matches, causing pain beyond description. Likewise, his bare legs are bound and a lit candle placed beneath them, leaving numerous burn holes in the legs of many victims"¹⁶.

El Moudjahid also showed that the torture carried out in Algeria during the years of the liberation revolution was practised, without exception, by the security and military institutions as a whole. It mentioned the Intervention Service for Protection, a security body attached to the French Ministry of the Interior, describing what took place at its premises in terms of savage torture, writing: "It is a French military organization which carries out, at its premises, acts of torture that have reached a degree of savagery; its officers frequently commit acts of killing without trial, and at times even force detainees to witness executions of fellow inmates. This organization has repeated such acts in several parts of the country"¹⁷. On the mechanisms of arrest and the conduct of torture, El Moudjahid wrote: "After Algerians suspected of having ties to or playing a role within FLN cells are arrested, they are taken to police

stations; before interrogation begins, the detainee is made to witness the torture of others to the point of death, in order to terrorize and intimidate him into compliance and to extract the desired 'information'"¹⁸ The newspaper also published an investigation into the camps spread across various regions of Algeria, setting out the savage practices inflicted there upon Algerian internees. It referred to the Djorf camp, one of the largest internment centres during the liberation revolution, which it described as one link in the chain of persecution practised by French colonialism throughout its presence on Algerian soil¹⁹.

El Moudjahid's coverage was not confined to exposing the torture inflicted upon Algerians in Algeria itself; it also followed the torture endured by Algerian migrants in France, publishing, at the start of 1959, a full investigation entitled "Detailed Facts on the Torture of Algerians in France," shedding light on the savage torture to which migrants were subjected by the French security authorities. Among the matters it raised was a letter sent by the lawyer Jacques Vergès, counsel to one of the detainees, to the Minister Delegate to the Government Presidency, Marlo, reporting two cases of torture inflicted by French police in the Argenteuil region: that of Mr. Arezki Hocine, arrested on 4 July 1958 at his workplace in the Potasse factories, who spent thirty hours at the police station and was tortured by being stripped, beaten over his entire body, placed under a cold-water jet at night, and given electric shocks four times — treatment that left him in a coma, after which he was taken to hospital, remaining in intensive care for a month and undergoing surgery for a damaged spleen; his body also bore a ten-centimetre wound resulting from the torture. It likewise reported a similar case, that of Mohamed Karama, arrested at five o'clock on 2 August in the Argenteuil suburb, who spent twenty-six hours at the police station, was tortured with electricity and beating, and emerged bearing three wounds affecting his lower limbs and genitals — injuries confirmed by the physician appointed by the military court's public prosecution, accompanied by a doctor from the Paris medical faculty²⁰.

In the course of its concern with exposing the torture practised by French forces in Algeria, El Moudjahid also followed the efforts of French intellectuals in confronting the machinery of French repression unleashed upon the Algerian people, and in standing in solidarity with the Algerian people in its ordeal. It highlighted the stance taken by numerous French intellectuals who denounced their state's policy in Algeria and the crimes committed there by French forces. Among the positions to the credit of French intellectuals, a number of French lawyers declared their opposition to the abuses and human-rights violations then occurring in Algeria as a result of the infractions committed by French forces; these lawyers did not hesitate to declare their position and to refuse to remain silent about such abuses and the repression endured by the people of Algeria. Forty-nine French lawyers expressed, in a joint statement, their rejection of what was happening in Algeria. El Moudjahid published the text of the statement, which included the following: "The time has passed when the head of government could declare that incidents of torture were mere exceptional occurrences that could be counted on the fingers of one hand; the truth is that torture has become an established and undeniable phenomenon that Algerians face daily"²¹. The newspaper regarded this statement as a step toward exposing French brutality, and as a direct acknowledgment of the abuses being committed against the Algerian people²².

2. Exposing Crimes of Rape against Algerian Women

Among the crimes habitually committed by French forces during the years of the Algerian Revolution were crimes of rape, which were adopted as a method of humiliating and degrading Algerians in order

to subdue them and thereby help suppress the armed Revolution. Numerous French sources pointed to the occurrence of such acts. The priest Jean Müller²³ confirmed the reality of these crimes of rape when he wrote: "Rape becomes one of the means of restoring order"²⁴ — meaning that French forces had begun to use the moral dimension as a means of pressuring Algerians into pacification and the suppression of the Revolution. A report submitted by the Commission of Protestant Counsellors (Fédération Protestante Française) likewise referred, albeit somewhat guardedly, to the crimes of rape that occurred in Algeria during the liberation revolution, stating: "Acts of rape occur throughout the regions of Algeria from time to time." Rape was carried out with the aim of forcing a father or brother to confess his affiliation with the Front, as happened in the case of the seventeen-year-old girl Dhahabia Aksim, who was raped before her father and uncle in order to compel them to confess, after which she was killed²⁵. It was also used to extract a confession from a woman herself when arrested on suspicion of affiliation with the Front, as occurred, for example, in the case of the twenty-year-old mujahida Djamila Boupacha, who was subjected to the most abominable forms of physical and psychological torture, culminating in her rape in order to compel her to confess²⁶.

El Moudjahid documented this shameful conduct on the part of the French colonial authorities in an even more horrifying form when it reported an incident that took place in a village near the town of Zemmoura, in eastern Algeria — an incident that confirmed rape was carried out systematically as an instrument of pressure upon Algerians to stand with the French against the Revolution. The incident arose from the villagers' refusal to join the ranks of French auxiliary forces (the harkas). An officer of the Native Affairs Bureau (SAS) then used rape as a means of pressuring the men into joining the harka units in order to prevent attacks by the National Liberation Army in the region. When the men refused, French forces surrounded the village and rounded up the men of all ages, their hands bound; a short distance away, the women of the village, aged between twelve and fifty, were also assembled. The responsible French officer ordered his soldiers to sexually assault the women amid the protests and outrage of the men, who were powerless to intervene, while the officer gave the men the choice between agreeing to join the harka or the continuation of the rapes. The ordeal continued for three days²⁷. The rapes ceased only once the men of the village agreed, under compulsion, to join the harka units, in order to bring an end to these horrific scenes that had defiled their honour and dignity.

On another occasion, El Moudjahid reported acts of torture and rape carried out by French forces in numerous villages of the Greater Kabylia region during October and November 1960, stating that the number of women raped exceeded one hundred; French forces did not content themselves with raping them, but also executed many of them.

From the foregoing, it is clear that acts of rape were committed with the encouragement and instigation of French officials and officers. The proof of this lies in the fact that the French authorities took no actual measures against army personnel for committing such acts of rape, and no soldier was referred to trial for this conduct, which violated human dignity and human rights. On the contrary, military commanders encouraged the commission of such heinous acts.

3. The Policy of Establishing Internment Camps for the Population

The policy of gathering the Algerian population into internment camps was not a new policy adopted by the French colonial authorities during the liberation revolution; rather, it had been followed in the early

years of the French occupation of Algeria, where it was used as a tool for confronting popular resistance movements against the occupation, as in the case of the Dahra region, the starting point of Bou Maza's resistance between 1845 and 1846, when the French military command established centres for gathering the population for security purposes.

As for the policy of internment during the liberation revolution²⁸, El Moudjahid indicated that it was first employed at the beginning of 1955, and that these initial camps were established haphazardly by French forces following military operations in rural areas, accompanied by acts of destruction of hamlets ("mechtas") and villages, after which the population would be gathered in areas near military bases. From the beginning of 1956²⁹, however, the colonial authorities proceeded to draw up permanent plans for the evacuation of rural areas known for their loyalty to the National Liberation Army, which they designated as forbidden zones. The population was distributed by one of two methods:

First Method

This was spontaneous, immediate, and sudden for the population: they were rapidly gathered by French military forces with the aim of cordoning off the targeted area, or of conducting a complete sweep of it, by order of the highest military authorities, leaving the population entirely at the mercy of the military forces³⁰. El Moudjahid indicated that this method involved the use of excessive force and violence, with French forces arriving, demolishing villages and hamlets, transporting the inhabitants by truck to their camps, and ordering them there to build huts of straw and mud, packed tightly together with only a single small exit, so that the watchtower could easily keep them under observation³¹

Second Method

In this method, the camps were planned and organized in advance: French military forces would grant the population a period of time to leave their hamlets and villages and move to the designated camp sites. These deportation and internment operations were not necessarily linked to military sweep operations, but were carried out following orders issued by the military authorities³².

El Moudjahid described this method of gathering the population as follows: "Military forces carry out a large-scale operation in certain regions in order to relocate the population to centres built near French military bases. A complete blockade is imposed around the area, which is placed at the mercy of aircraft, artillery, and tanks; ground forces then advance toward the hamlets and villages, granting the population a period of one or two days to move to the dwellings established beside the military base, under threat that the villages will be demolished once the period has expired."³³

As for living conditions in the camps, they were extremely wretched. The dwellings occupied by the inhabitants were built from simple materials by traditional means, lacking even the most basic conditions for human habitation³⁴. In this connection, El Moudjahid cited the French monk Rohit, who, after visiting the camps of the Orléansville province (present-day Chlef), reported on the deteriorating living conditions of the internees, stating: "I visited some centres where there were no blankets whatsoever, only worn-out tents; near Chlef, nine families had been gathered together in a stable."³⁵

These harsh living conditions in the camps were accompanied by a deterioration in the economic situation of the residents. El Moudjahid pointed to the worsening economic conditions in the camps, calling them "camps of death," and reported a statement by the French bishop J. Beaumont, who said: "In one of the centres of the Algiers region I saw five children dying of hunger; and at a centre 75 km from Algiers,

potatoes were distributed to the internees, who ate them raw, unwashed, such was the intensity of their hunger"³⁶. The newspaper stated that what reflected the deteriorating conditions inside the camps was the prevalence of unemployment and the internees' dependence on aid provided by charitable associations: each individual's daily share amounted to 150 grams of wheat, sometimes falling to as little as 90 grams — meaning that what an individual consumed in the camps amounted to roughly a quarter of the minimum required to sustain life³⁷.

The deterioration of living and economic conditions had a negative effect on the health situation of the internees, particularly after the worsening of housing conditions and the deteriorating economic circumstances; health conditions became extremely poor. El Moudjahid, describing this deteriorating health situation among the population in the camps and citing the statements of Bishop Beaumont, wrote: "I saw children whose bones stood out clearly beneath their skin, children worn down by fever and cold who could not find even a single tablet of quinine to halt the fever; I saw them shivering with fever as they lay on the ground without any covering. I visited many centres in which there was not a single blanket; where one did exist, it was sometimes a single blanket shared by thirteen people huddled together beneath it in one tent"³⁸. The newspaper also reported the spread of deadly diseases, particularly tuberculosis, among children³⁹. Alarmed by the gravity of the situation, it alerted local public opinion and issued calls for help to draw the attention of Arab and world opinion to the deteriorating health conditions of the internees in Algeria, describing the wretched state of the internees at the Douéra camp as one in which they faced an imminent threat of death. The efforts of El Moudjahid produced positive results: a first appeal came from Paris, issued by the head of the Church relief organization that provided social assistance to the internees, addressed to the French nation, stating that "the severe shortage of doctors and social workers has produced tragic consequences"⁴⁰.

A second appeal was issued from Geneva during the session of the World Health Assembly of the United Nations, when delegations from seventeen participating states submitted a memorandum on the Algerian camps to the chairmanship of the conference, drawing attention to the tragic conditions to which the internees had been reduced, stating: "We are moved by the tragic state to which hundreds of thousands of Algerians, most of them children, women, and the elderly, have been reduced." These states set out their demands as follows⁴¹:

- The complete abandonment of all internment operations.
- Adherence to the United Nations Charter.
- The dismantling of the internment camps and gathering centres.

The continuation of the policy of neglect on the part of the French colonial authorities toward the internees was a cause of the further deterioration of their health conditions, as reported in the accounts of investigators who visited these camps and observed the rising rates of infant mortality — with one child dying daily at the Ouarsenis centres (present-day Bordj Bou Naâma), located in southern Algeria⁴². El Moudjahid pointed to the deteriorating health condition of children in the camps, writing that the children of the gathering centres bore visible symptoms of disease, with nothing left of them but their skeletal frames; others suffered from fever as they lay on the ground without bedding, blankets, or medicine of any kind⁴³ — a situation that caused the collapse of the morale and psychological state of the internees.

The policy of the colonial authorities was not confined to the deterioration of the social, economic, and health circumstances of the internees; it also pursued a policy of psychological pressure upon them by forcing them to perform daily tasks designed to weaken their morale and steadfastness and to erode their attachment to, and support for, the army of the National Liberation Front. El Moudjahid wrote in this regard: "The internee, even if ill, is forced to attend roll-call three times a day, and is compelled to salute the French flag. In winter, the camp authorities keep people standing at military attention for long hours, until some of them faint"⁴⁴.

It should be noted that the population of the camps continued to grow over time, in parallel with the intensification and expansion of military operations conducted by the army of the National Liberation Front. The French writer Raphaëlle Branche indicates that their number reached one million by 1959, rising to more than two million by the end of the Revolution — close to a quarter of Algeria's population⁴⁵. In this connection, El Moudjahid pointed to the falsehoods propagated by French officials on this subject, reporting with derision and irony the statement made on 4 March by the minister Robert Lacoste⁴⁶, the French Governor-General in Algeria, who said: "The forbidden zone will extend over no more than a few kilometres, and its implementation will require the relocation of no more than five hundred of the inhabitants of these areas"⁴⁷

The National Liberation Army's Treatment of French Prisoners and Soldiers

The Algerian Revolution was able to advance toward victory owing to the profound rapport that existed between the leadership guiding the Revolution and the people to whom its call was addressed. This same rapport gave the mujahid groups, from the very first day, their distinctive character of noble conduct, exemplary behaviour, courage in confronting the enemy, and respect for the laws of war. For despite the circumstances of war and the fierce military hostility between the two sides, members of the National Liberation Army remained committed to their ethical obligations and humanitarian norms. Among the numerous testimonies of French nationals who spoke of the humane treatment they received from members of the National Liberation Army, the following may be cited:

— The story of the soldier "Jean" Chevalier, which represented one of the genuine images of the humanity to which the liberation revolution adhered in its treatment of French prisoners: he was released together with his fiancée, Mademoiselle "Kéria," who, after her release, described the conditions she faced during her captivity, saying: "We were not treated badly; indeed, they did not try to separate me from my fiancé, which is what I had feared most. As we moved through the mountains, the revolutionaries supplied us with honey and bread, and when we settled at army bases our food was better, more appetizing, and more varied"⁴⁸

One conscript recounts that, after fleeing together with three companions, having covered long distances and been overcome by fatigue, hunger, and thirst, they were compelled to surrender themselves to six Algerians, calling out to them by gesture, "Feed us." Although the Algerians had been wary of approaching them, they nonetheless fed them, treated them generously, allowed them to rest, and went further still, escorting them across the western border despite the mines and barbed wire⁴⁹. At a time when their homes had been destroyed and their families killed, members of the National Liberation Army could have turned into killers, abandoning their humane values; instead, they provided them with

assistance in rejoining their families, and dealt with them kindly and in accordance with the laws governing war, as recounted by numerous French soldiers who had deserted the colonial forces⁵⁰.

Two French prisoners who had been conscripts in Wilaya III likewise report, after their release by the Provisional Algerian Government in 1959, that they received good treatment from members of the National Liberation Army: they were never subjected to insults, abuse, or humiliation, nor was any physical or psychological pressure — torture or threat — used against them; indeed, they ate their meals before everyone else, which left them embarrassed by the kindness and humanity of their treatment. They discovered a regular army with a high degree of organization, comprising numerous units armed with the best weapons, competent medics, and skilled technicians for manufacturing and repairing weapons — men distinguished by enthusiasm and strong resolve, struggling to achieve a lofty ideal in which they believed. Nor was this resolve confined to the revolutionaries alone; even the local population displayed a will and determination to regain their independence that De Gaulle was unable to overcome, a fact that gave him pause and led him to reconsider his calculations regarding the Revolution and his attempts to separate the population from the revolutionaries through peaceful means. De Gaulle himself recounts that he asked a young Arab doctor in the town of Saïda for his opinion, and the man answered, as De Gaulle described it, with tears filling his eyes: "What we want and need is to be responsible for ourselves, and for no one else to be responsible for us"⁵¹.

These prisoners also recount that, on the day of their release, 18 May 1959, a doctor visited them and gave them clean clothing, and they were informed that their release was not intended for propaganda abroad, but stemmed from purely humanitarian motives. As they parted, soldiers of the National Liberation Army shook their hands warmly and expressed their gladness at the prisoners' release.⁵²

In the same vein, Colonel Tahar Zbiri recounts, regarding the treatment of prisoners, that he took with him five prisoners following a successful ambush as he made his way toward Tunisia; although these men had sustained injuries, he brought three army doctors to treat them that very night⁵³.

Among the many examples of medical care provided to prisoners, one may cite the provision of nivaquine treatment to the prisoner "Berkit" after he contracted marsh fever, the transfer of "Vincennes-Mosel" to a National Liberation Army hospital unit on the Tunisian border, and the surgical removal of the appendix of the prisoner "Eugène Vialaron," who remained in the army hospital for fifteen days.⁵⁴

From this it may be said that the conscripts of the National Liberation Army bore no hatred or animosity toward these Frenchmen; they sought only to achieve their independence in order to manage their own social and domestic affairs.

In another context, we have the testimony of Mademoiselle Micheline Comès⁵⁵, who was taken captive in July 1957 and was left entirely free to write as she wished, which she did willingly. In a letter she titled "My Stay among the Soldiers of the National Liberation Army," she recounts that, after the bus carrying her to Tlemcen was stopped by the revolutionaries, she and the other passengers were ordered to disembark and were addressed respectfully and courteously, asked about their wellbeing, and greeted with a handshake — a kindly treatment that the revolutionaries consistently observed⁵⁶. Throughout her stay, all the revolutionaries, without exception, whether commanders or ordinary fighters, showed her great respect, frequently checking whether she needed anything; she received care beyond what she could have imagined, drinking coffee, listening to music and to national anthems sung by the revolutionaries,

of which she approved. During her three-day stay, the commander took her on an outing among the fields, even allowing her to use his binoculars to enjoy the view, and along the way bought her a pair of sandals after her shoes had worn through⁵⁷. During her transfer to another camp, the revolutionaries carried her burden once it had exhausted her, to spare her the fatigue; and the consideration went further still: after marching for an hour and a half, on reaching one of the houses, they seated her on soft cushions and offered her coffee and bread, even asking whether she liked milk, and served her couscous with plenty of meat for dinner, according to her own account⁵⁸. Despite the shock of her abduction, she felt reassured by the revolutionaries as a result of their good treatment, to the point that she would urge some of the revolutionaries to ride the mule whenever exhaustion overcame one of them.

One French journalist recounts that, after visiting Wilaya of Oran in 1956 and during his stay in the areas he visited, he found that soldiers of the National Liberation Army strictly observed the laws of war: he saw two French prisoners living among the mujahidin, eating what the mujahidin ate and reading newspapers, before the leadership of the National Liberation Army released them — prisoners about whom the press deliberately maintained silence⁵⁹.

Certain testimonies from mujahidin during the liberation revolution reveal a matter of considerable importance regarding the nature of the confrontation between the National Liberation Army and the French army — a dimension that extends beyond the military aspect alone to encompass the human, propagandistic, and psychological dimensions of war. In one of the battles fought by FLN mujahidin against French forces, a number of French soldiers fell into captivity, transforming the incident from a mere military outcome into an event of profound historical significance, revealing the gap between the image that colonial propaganda sought to entrench regarding the revolutionaries, and the reality of their conduct on the ground.

After the battle ended, the mujahidin set up a simple camp to which they brought the French prisoners, who were in a difficult psychological and physical state, showing signs of cold, fear, and anxiety, their clothing tattered and worn. Yet the treatment the mujahidin gave them ran contrary to what these prisoners had expected: they provided them with heavy blankets, hot coffee, and food, in an attempt to ease their suffering and reassure them. This treatment derives its historical significance from the fact that it directly confronted the perceptions French propaganda had instilled in the minds of its soldiers, who had portrayed the mujahidin as violent, bloodthirsty bands. Yet the lived experience of captivity revealed to these soldiers the falsity of that image, and showed that the Algerian Revolution was not merely an armed movement, but carried an ethical and political vision in its dealings even with its adversaries⁶⁰.

The significance of this incident grows further when the mujahidin moved the prisoners westward, approaching the Morice Line, one of the most important military installations established by France to seal off the Algerian Revolution from its regional extensions. With its electrified barbed wire, minefields, and intensive military surveillance, this line was designed to prevent the mujahidin from crossing into Morocco and to cut off supply routes for arms and men, thereby encircling and strangling the Revolution both militarily and politically. The approach of the French prisoners to this line therefore heightened their fear, for they were well aware of its danger and of what it represented as a symbol of French military strength and the policy of isolation and blockade.⁶¹

Yet the mujahidin's success in crossing the Morice Line safely constituted a significant symbolic moment: the prisoners' fear turned to astonishment, and even to mockery of the very effectiveness of the French fortifications. One of the prisoners remarked that this money had been "wasted for nothing," referring to the enormous resources France had devoted to building this line, set against the mujahidin's ability to cross it despite the simplicity of their means. This paradox deepened further when two French warplanes pursued the group and fired upon them for nearly half an hour, yet the result amounted to no more than the death of a donkey and a goat, while the mujahidin and the prisoners all survived unharmed. This episode reflects the limits of French military superiority when confronted with a revolutionary war grounded in mobility, geographic knowledge, and tactical flexibility.

This treatment left a clear impression on the prisoners, evident in the letters they sent to their families. One of them, writing after his capture following a clash on Saturday, 11 January, explained that his family might have assumed he had been killed, but that the reality was altogether different. He affirmed in his letter that the prisoners received good food, bread, and plenty of sweetened hot coffee, and that even cigarettes of various kinds were given to them — to the point that he compared their life in captivity favourably with their previous life in the French military camps. The importance of these letters lies in the fact that they were not mere personal testimonies, but constituted counter-documents to colonial propaganda, since they were issued by French soldiers who had lived the experience themselves and attested to a humane treatment that did not correspond to the image the French army had painted of the mujahidin.⁶²

During the great Souk Ahras battle of 1958, fifteen airmen of various European nationalities surrendered; in doing so, they wrote to the rest of their comrades urging them to surrender themselves, affirming that the Front had treated them as prisoners of war, preserved their rights, and promised that they would soon be returned to their home countries.⁶³

In a further instance, French conscripts who deserted the Eighth Parachute Regiment⁶⁴ placed themselves under the protection of the National Liberation Front after their unit had begun a large-scale "ratissage" (mopping-up) operation; they spoke of the appalling savagery of the French army, and spent three days as guests of the Algerians, who guided them toward the political commissars.⁶⁵

The Soummam Congress laid down strict regulations governing the treatment and care of prisoners: it prohibited execution by slaughter, mutilation, or the disfigurement of a person's appearance, and imposed severe penalties, extending to the death penalty, on anyone who violated the honour of a girl or woman — such penalties to be imposed only following a fair and lawful trial.⁶⁶

The liberation revolution thus possessed frameworks governing the conduct of its combat units, derived fundamentally from Islam, which safeguards the sanctity of human life.

The Humanitarian Legitimacy of the Algerian Revolution in the Face of the Colonial Narrative ***The Ethical, Humane, and Legal Constraints Observed by the Mujahid***

These are directives worthy of the attention of every Algerian citizen, so that he may grasp the principles of the Revolution of 1 November — principles whose observance by the mujahidin made victory possible. They were as follows:

Military Regulations

- The obligation of loyalty to the homeland and of working to free the country from the grip of colonialism.
- Every mujahid must carry out military, moral, and religious orders.
- Every soldier must obey the commander of his unit; any disobedience or insubordination exposes him to punishment.
- The maintenance and upkeep of weapons and military equipment.⁶⁷
- No soldier may leave his unit or company without the permission of a responsible officer.

Moral Regulations

- To observe good manners, sound morals, and soundness of judgement.
- To work in the service of the homeland, of justice, of honour, and of dignity.
- To grasp the true meaning of the revolutionary struggle and of belonging to the National Liberation Front.
- To believe firmly in the inevitability of the Revolution and in its objective.

Religious Regulations

- To maintain the performance of prayer and to warn against neglecting it, linking it firmly to the armed struggle.
- To know the Islamic religion and how Muslims are to conduct themselves toward others in time of war.⁶⁸

The Humanity of the Revolution

The humanity of the Revolution lay, above all, in the revolutionary formation it instilled in the Algerian individual, whether man or woman, soldier or civilian. The Revolution first taught the Algerian that his revolt against the French colonial order should be an organized revolution, not blind tribal rebellion. Lacoste himself acknowledged that what he confronted in Algeria was not a tribal uprising or clan-based agitation, but a genuine revolution, organized in the modern sense of the term. From the Revolution, the Algerian individual learned many lessons: he learned not to be governed by individual and personal emotional impulses, but to submit to collective judgement, deliberation, and carefully studied plans; he learned to free himself from fear, so that he came to stand, even unarmed, before French soldiers laden with lethal weapons.⁶⁹

The Revolution instilled in the Algerian person a new spirit of commitment and sincere awareness of higher ideals, and transformed the values of his outlook entirely: the bonds of kinship and tribalism among Algerians were replaced by a firm bond — that of revolutionary conviction and national aims. The horizons of thought thus broadened before the people, who were freed from narrow factionalism. The Revolution taught the Algerian a spirit of solidarity and self-sacrifice; for the first time in our social life we witnessed the wealthy and those of middling means giving everything they owned to relieve the victims of persecution. Thus the Revolution raised the standing of the Algerian individual in the human sphere, rescuing him from moral decline, so that he became a person elevated in his morals, his thinking, and his conduct. The Revolution gave the Algerian a purpose to live for in life, and to die for in the struggle.⁷⁰

Justice in Dealing with the Settlers

Through all of its political and military institutions, the Algerian Revolution established the principle of justice, regarding every segment of Algerian society as an essential link in the success of the Algerian cause; it considered even the French settlers an inseparable part of its future project. This was made clear by the French physician of Martinican origin, Frantz Fanon, who stated: "The European minority is far from being the monolithic bloc that one imagines... reality has proven the existence of contacts between certain European settlers and the Algerian elite, while we likewise find that, within its literature,⁷¹ the National Liberation Front states that not all European settlers are to be regarded as sharing a single, unified colonial stance."

The Soummam Congress of 1956 devoted particular attention to the settler population, considering them a vital link in the future of the Algerian cause — indeed, the true key to its resolution; the mujahidin regarded this position as falling within the broader policy of accommodating minorities, on a par with the Jewish community, in terms of both rights and obligations.

Justice in the Treatment of Prisoners

As noted in the second section of this study with respect to the National Liberation Front's treatment of French prisoners, and how it cared for them and provided everything they needed within the bounds of the mujahidin's capacity and the prevailing circumstances of time and place, the Front did not confine this matter to the military domain alone, but also deployed it in the political and media spheres. The presence of French prisoners in the hands of the Revolution demonstrated, on the one hand, that what was occurring in Algeria was not, as France claimed, mere security disturbances, but an actual war between a colonial power and a liberation movement. On the other hand, the Front's treatment of these prisoners served to show that it possessed a degree of organization, discipline, and responsibility, and was not merely a collection of uncontrolled, violent groups, as colonial propaganda had portrayed it. Recent studies on FLN prisoners indicate that this file remained, for a long time, on the margins of French memory, since France itself initially refused to acknowledge the existence of a "war," or of "prisoners of war," as recognizing prisoners would have meant implicitly recognizing the opposing party and the very nature of the conflict⁷³. From this, the sensitivity of the subject becomes understandable: the prisoners were not merely detained individuals, but political evidence that threatened the French narrative, which sought to keep the Revolution confined within the category of crime rather than war.

French Colonial Crimes and the Exposure of the False Claims to Civilizational Mission

Discussion of the legitimacy of the Algerian Revolution cannot be separated from the nature of the colonial violence it confronted. French colonialism was not merely a foreign administration imposed upon Algeria, but an integrated system of political, economic, military, and cultural domination. During the years of the Revolution, this violence took multiple forms: torture, internment, extrajudicial execution, the displacement of the population, the establishment of internment camps, and the practice of collective punishment against villages and regions suspected of supporting the Revolution.

The war of liberation exposed the profound contradiction between the declared French discourse of liberty and human rights and the colonial practice on the ground. The state that presented itself as heir to the French Revolution and the values of the Enlightenment practised, in Algeria, repressive methods aimed at breaking the will of the Algerian people, rather than upholding the rule of law as it claimed.

Torture, particularly from the mid-1950s onward, became one of the clearest manifestations of this contradiction, for it showed that, when colonialism failed to persuade the subjugated human being, it resorted instead to the destruction of his body and psyche.

The question of torture during the Algerian Revolution was no longer merely a political accusation levelled by the National Liberation Front or the national movement; it became a historical fact later acknowledged by numerous French voices. The French presidency acknowledged, in the case of the activist Maurice Audin, that his death in 1957 occurred within the context of a system of detention and interrogation that allowed for the practice of torture during the Algerian war⁷². French acknowledgment of state responsibility for the killing of Larbi Ben M'hidi in 1957 likewise confirmed the collapse of the older narrative of his "suicide," after subsequent testimony showed that he had been killed at the hands of French military personnel. The significance of these acknowledgments lies not only in their symbolic dimension, but in the fact that they confirm colonial violence was not a limited individual aberration, but a practice bound up with the very logic of colonial war itself.

The colonial narrative sought to portray the violence of the Revolution as the root of the problem, while ignoring the fact that it was colonialism itself that had established the conditions of violence both before and after the Revolution erupted. An occupation that confiscates land and sovereignty, deprives the indigenous population of its political rights, and treats their demands as a security threat necessarily creates a situation in which resistance becomes the expression of a violated right. Accordingly, the crimes of French colonialism cannot be read merely as bloody events, but as evidence of the very nature of the system against which the Revolution rose.

The policy of collective repression was among the gravest threats facing Algerians during the Revolution. Rather than distinguishing between combatants and civilians, the colonial authorities frequently treated the whole of Algerian society as a suspect environment. This led to a widening of the circle of arrests, raids, and deportations, and to the transformation of villages and hamlets into spaces of surveillance and punishment. In this context, the internment camps emerged as a means of isolating the population from the Revolution, yet they also revealed, at the same time, that the colonial administration was well aware that the Revolution was not an organization detached from the people, but a profound extension of its consciousness and demands⁷³.

These practices weakened the French narrative that claimed to be defending order and the civilizing mission. A system that requires torture, internment camps, and extrajudicial execution in order to sustain itself forfeits its moral foundation. To the extent that France sought to portray the Revolution as illegitimate violence, its own daily practices granted the Revolution ever greater political and humanitarian justification. It became evident that the Algerian was confronting not a neutral, lawful authority, but a colonial system founded on the denial of his humanity and the deprivation of his right to sovereignty.

Conclusion

Through tracing the contents of El Moudjahid and comparing them with the testimonies of French and other foreign parties contemporary with the events of the Revolution, this study arrives at a number of findings, the most significant of which are:

- The French colonial authorities pursued a systematic and consistent policy of arrest and torture against Algerians, which enjoyed the direct support of the highest levels of the French government, and was not an isolated individual practice as the authorities sought to claim.
- Crimes of rape were used as a systematic instrument of psychological and moral pressure to compel Algerians to confess or submit to the French authorities, and were committed with almost total impunity.
- The policy of internment camps entrenched a compounded suffering for the Algerian civilian population — economic, medical, and psychological — reaching the point of threatening the lives of children and the elderly, which prompted international and ecclesiastical bodies to act and to demand its cessation.
- The National Liberation Army adhered to a clear ethical and legal frame of reference in its treatment of French prisoners, manifested in the provision of medical care and food, as confirmed by the testimonies of the prisoners themselves in their letters to their families.
- The Soummam Congress issued strict legal regulations for the protection of prisoners and the criminalization of assaults upon honour, reflecting an early organizational awareness of the importance of the humanitarian dimension in the conduct of armed conflict.
- The testimonies of the French soldiers themselves constituted counter-documents to colonial propaganda, exposing the falsity of the image the official French media had constructed of the mujahidin, and contributing to the erosion of the international legitimacy of the colonial discourse.
- El Moudjahid succeeded in deploying the implicit comparison between the brutality of colonial practice and the humanity of the revolutionaries' conduct to construct an ethical and political legitimacy for the Algerian Revolution before Arab and international public opinion.

Notes

1. Abdelkader Fekaier, "French Torture of Algerians in Prisons and Internment Camps, as Reflected in Dr. Abdallah Cherit's Book *The Algerian Revolution in the International Press*, Al-Nasiriya Journal for Social and Historical Studies, no. 1, 2022, p. 29.
2. Henri Philippe Pétain (1856–1951): One of the commanders of World War I, he became Minister of War in 1934, then French Ambassador to Spain after the Civil War in 1939. He served as Acting President in Paul Reynaud's cabinet. After the fall of France, he formed a government that made the city of Vichy its seat instead of Paris. He fled to Germany following the Allied entry into France in 1944, then returned to France and was tried for high treason, sentenced to death — a sentence later commuted to imprisonment. See: Ahmad Atiyya al-Allah, *Political Dictionary*, Arab Renaissance House, Cairo, 1986, p. 245.
3. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 12, 15/11/1957.
4. Zubair Rashid, "The Position of French Left-Wing Parties on the Algerian Question," *Al-Akademiyya Journal of Social and Human Studies*, No. 09, 2013, p. 147.
5. Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *Colonialism, Genocide: Reflections on Civil War and the Colonial State*, tr. Noura Bouzida, Algeria, 2007, p. 203.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

7. Jean Pierre Vittori, *Confession d'un professionnel de la torture*, Ed. Ramsay Images, Paris, 1980, p. 25.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
9. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 29, 17/09/1958.
10. Henri Alleg: A French Jew born in 1921 into a well-off family, he was active in the French Communist Party before moving to Algeria in 1939. He managed the newspaper *Republican Algeria* between 1950 and 1955. He fell into the hands of a French paratroop battalion and was subjected to all forms of torture at the Abiar interrogation center. Upon his release, he published a book titled *The Question* that caused a worldwide sensation. He passed away in 2013. See: Ahmad Amin Salek, *Henri Alleg: Friend of the Algerian Revolution 1921–2013*, Fahrenheit Publishing and Distribution House, Algeria, 2026, p. 25.
11. Henri Alleg, *La Question*, Ed. de Minuit, Paris, 1958, p. 15.
12. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 58, 17/12/1957.
13. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Crimes of the French Army*, Ed. La Découverte/Poche, Paris, 2006, p. 34.
14. Pierre-Henri Simon, *Against Torture*, Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1957, p. 76.
15. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 58, 28/12/1957.
16. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 13, 01/12/1957.
17. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 52, 15/11/1959.
18. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 10, 05/09/1957.
19. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 41, 01/05/1959.
20. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 47, 27/07/1959.
21. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 10, 05/09/1957.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Jean Müller: A clergyman born in the French city of Metz in 1931, he joined the French Scouts and became a prominent member. He was drafted into the Algerian War in 1955, and was killed in an ambush set in Wadi Asir in Boumerdes on 27 October 1956. The newspaper *Témoignage Chrétien* had published a number of his letters in which he revealed many inhumane acts, including: torture, forest patrols, collective punishment, and reprisals.
24. Raffaella Brun, *Torture and the Practices of the French Army during the Algerian War of Independence*, tr. Ahmad Muhammad Bakli, Amdoukal, Algeria, 2010, p. 378.
25. Boualem Najadi, *The Executioners*, tr. Muhammad al-Miaraji, Ministry of Mujahideen, Algeria, 2007, p. 265.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 66, 18 April 1960.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 99, 03/07/1961.
30. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
31. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 99, 03/07/1961.
32. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
33. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 99, 03/07/1961.

34. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *op. cit.*, p. 219.
35. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 57, 15/12/1959.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 51, 21/09/1959.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 51, 21/09/1959.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 51, 21/09/1959.
46. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *op. cit.*, p. 219.
47. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 57, 15/12/1959.
48. Muhammad Muhammadi, "The Religious and Humanitarian Dimensions of the Practices of the Algerian Revolution 1954–1962 (The Treatment of French Prisoners as a Model)," *Journal of the Anthropology of Religions*, Vol. 16, No. 01, 2020, p. 165.
49. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 35, 15/01/1959.
50. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 42, 18/05/1959.
51. *ibid.*
52. Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope (Renewal 1958–1962)*, tr. Smouhi Fawq al-Ada, Oueidat Publications, Beirut, 1971, p. 85.
53. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 43, 01/06/1959.
54. Al-Taher al-Zbiri, *Memoirs of the Last of the Historic Aurès Commanders 1929–1962*, ANEP Publications, Algeria, 2008, p. 190.
55. Michelline Comez, a student at the Girls' Secondary School in Tlemcen, residing on the Oujda Road in the city of Ghazaouet.
56. Khiyati Mustafa, *Human Rights in Algeria during the French Occupation*, National Institution for Communication, Algeria, 2013, p. 455.
57. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 02, 01/07/1956.
58. *Ibid.*
59. Bassam al-Asali, *The Army of the Algerian National Liberation Front*, House of Rarities, Beirut, 1986, p. 127. See also: *Al-Mujahid*, No. 09, 20/08/1957.
60. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 17, 01/02/1958.
61. *Ibid.*
62. *ibid.*
63. Zdravko Pecar, *Algeria: Testimony of a Yugoslav Reporter on the Algerian War*, ENAG Publishing House, 2009, p. 116.

64. The unit was under the command of a colonel named Vinfou Roger, aged 20, a painter by trade who volunteered for the Algerian War in March 1956; the second was Chomer Michel Siegel, an electrician aged 21 who enlisted on 20 August 1956. See: *Al-Mujahid*, No. 13, 01/12/1957.
65. Najadi Muhammad Muqran, *Testimony of an Officer from the Secret Services of the Algerian Revolution*, tr. Muhammad al-Miaraji, Algeria, n.d., pp. 110–113.
66. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 09, 20/08/1957.
67. Farkous Yasser, *Two Mujahideen and Two Heroes of the Algerian Revolution*, House of Knowledge for Printing, Association of the First of November 1945, Algeria, n.d., p. 60.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 61–62.
69. *Al-Mujahid*, No. 11, 01/11/1957.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Mohamed Dahmani, *Algeria: Historical Legitimacy and Political Continuity*, Sycomore Publishing House, 1979, p. 13.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
73. Gilbert Meynier, *The FLN Revolution 1954–1962*, Insaniyat, 2004, p. 18.