The Sociological Interpretation of Prejudice and Hate Speech through Some Theoretical Approaches

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Abstract:
Forms of prejudice and hate speech vary across societies. Some are ideological or political. Others are linked to religion, or to economic conditions such as unemployment, poverty, and social exclusion. Some are also connected with tribal or clan-based affiliation and other related forms. Propagandistic media contributes strongly to the spread of hate speech and prejudice. Many social groups use it through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other platforms.
The greatest danger appears when prejudice and hate speech enter people's conscience and thinking. They may then become, for some individuals, a central component of systems of social action. Their presence in social relations weakens solidarity among members of society. It may also disturb the balance between opposing social groups. In this study, we seek to provide a sociological interpretation of this phenomenon through some psychological and social theoretical approaches concerned with this growing issue.
Serious scientific research should therefore trace and study the origins of the pitfalls produced by hate speech and prejudice. These dangers may push any society into conflict, decline, and disintegration.
Keywords: Prejudice; Hate Speech; Sociological Interpretation; Psychological Theories; Intergroup Conflict.

Introduction:

Although the term "hate speech" is widely used in legal and political fields, there is often disagreement about its scope and about the best ways to address it. This research paper therefore begins with a brief clarification of this term. It also explains the need for effective strategies and methods to combat hate speech through the theories that have studied and analyzed it.

The Concept of Hate Speech:

First definition:

The term "hate speech" has been defined and understood in different ways at national and international levels. It is important to distinguish between the ordinary expression "hateful speech," which has become a broad and multi-meaning concept, and the legal term "hate speech." The latter refers to expressions that are punishable under criminal law, or subject to sanctions under civil or administrative law. According to Recommendation No. R(97)20 of the Committee of Ministers on "hate speech," adopted in 1997, the term should be understood to cover all forms of expression that spread, incite, promote, or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, or other forms of hatred based on intolerance. This includes intolerance expressed through aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, as well as discrimination and hostility against minorities and migrants.

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Second definition:

Hate speech may also be understood as advocacy, promotion, or incitement, in any form, to denigrate, hate, or defame a person or a group of persons. It also includes harassment, insult, negative stereotyping, stigmatization, or threat against a person or a group. It further includes the justification of these forms of expression when they are based on "race," color, descent, national or ethnic origin, age, disability, language, religion or belief, sex, or other personal characteristics or status. ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 15 also states that hate speech may take the form of public denial, trivialization, justification, or condoning of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes that have been legally established by courts. It may also include glorifying persons convicted of such crimes.

The Psychological Approach to the Interpretation of Prejudice and Hate Speech:

1. Frustration-Aggression Theory (Scapegoat Theory)

This theory assumes that frustration often arouses aggression. When the source of frustration is threatening, vague, or undefined, aggression is likely to be redirected toward a substitute object. This substitute becomes a scapegoat. Aggression is then expressed against it in the form of prejudice. Thus, the theory treats prejudice as displaced aggression (Taylor et al., 1997, pp. 182-183).

Aggression has many outlets. Alongside projection and rationalization, aggression is often transferred by replacing one target with another (Lambert & Lambert, 1993, p. 44). If aggression is prevented from being discharged, it may return toward the self, where the person harms himself or herself (Mustafa Zayour, 1986, p. 202). In general, the theory assumes that the center of the problem of prejudice lies in aggression and its susceptibility to displacement. Schidlinger (1970, pp. 101-119) argues that aggressive tendencies always appear within the group, just as libidinal drives do. These tendencies may sometimes be a response to deprivation. Some may also arise spontaneously from the id. Yet affective bonds among individuals resist the emergence of aggression inside the group and redirect it outward, toward a particular individual or an entire group. This is known as the victim phenomenon. Just as the primitive person inserts a needle into a wax figure representing his enemy, the modern person inserts a symbolic needle into a substitute victim. Freud therefore stresses that conflict between groups is more common and more difficult to resolve than conflict within a single group. This is because aggressive drives can be displaced outside the group. The libidinal bonds, namely object relations and identifications, are the main feature of psychological groups. They allow aggressive responses to be modified and redirected. By contrast, intergroup conflict is often reinforced by displaced negative feelings that originally emerge within the life of the group.

In sum, aggression may be inevitable, whether as a response to environmental pressure or as a result of internal forces related to the human psychological constitution. Displacement is one of the defense mechanisms used by the ego in dealing with aggression. It transfers aggression toward an external group. This makes displacement, as an internal psychological mechanism, useful for understanding prejudice. The theory offers a general point of departure for explaining prejudice and its spread as a common feature of human social life. It also contributes to understanding individual differences in prejudice. More frustrated individuals are often more prejudiced than those who are less frustrated. In addition, the theory has been highly influential and widely discussed in major references on prejudice. Its appeal lies in its strength, generality, and ability to explain important social phenomena.

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Nevertheless, the theory has several limitations. One limitation is that it does not specify the criteria by which a scapegoat or victim is selected. Bergmann (1994, p. 577) responds that learned negative attitudes play an important role in scapegoat selection. Cardwell (1994, p. 70) also argues that the dominant culture first defines the targets of prejudice. These groups are socially prepared and qualified to become scapegoats. In his dialectical analysis of the scapegoat phenomenon, Fouad Zakaria (1971, pp. 7-8) argues that society may use an existing minority as a scapegoat to discharge feelings of failure, despair, or frustration. This may occur in some cases and cannot be denied by an objective researcher. Yet, he argues, the recurrent selection of one specific minority over thousands of years, such as the Jewish minority, requires deep reflection. It leads one to search for the roots of prejudice within that minority before searching for them in the surrounding society. In this view, anti-Jewish prejudice is counter-prejudice, or in most cases a reaction. The original act and basic prejudice are attributed to persistent provocative myths and legends that have long formed part of Jewish heritage. This dialectical analysis suggests that a group in which prejudice is originally woven into its mentality may become a candidate for scapegoating by other groups.

A further criticism is that the theory is too individualistic. It may therefore be unable to deal effectively with collective phenomena. It may also be incomplete because it implies that collective aggression against an outgroup is a set of accumulations and transformations of motivational states in the individuals of that group. Duckitt (2000, p. 161), however, argues that this criticism misses an important point. The theory does not present the emergence of prejudice as a motivational state that spreads among individuals. Instead, it assumes that organized human life is a hidden source of frustration as a continuous process. This creates accumulations of floating hostility within individuals. According to this theory, the actual emergence of prejudice is social rather than individual. Social frustrations embedded in the social structure surface through the mechanisms of individual motivation.

Another criticism is that most studies that attempted to test the role of displaced hostility caused by frustration in the formation of prejudiced attitudes were correlational. Such studies seem useful for examining prejudice in light of individual differences. They do not, however, prove frustration as a general cause of prejudice, because correlational studies do not permit clear causal conclusions. Their results concerning the relationship between prejudice and frustration have also been inconsistent. Nevertheless, several experimental studies confirmed that frustration may lead to prejudice. Davidoff cites the study by Neal Miller and Richard Bugelski. The researchers gave young men in a long and boring camp a very difficult test. The test took a long time and caused them to miss a local play they had wanted to see all week. Before and after the test, participants were asked to review a list of desirable and undesirable traits and to decide whether these traits were present or absent among Mexican and Japanese peoples. After the frustrating experience, the participants assigned only a very small number of positive traits and a very large number of negative traits. The researchers assumed that frustration increased their desire for aggression. Since they could not discharge aggression against the experimenters, aggression was displaced toward a suitable target. Other experimental studies, though very few, also showed that prejudiced individuals often tend to displace aggression arising from collective situations (cited in Adel Ezz El-Din Al-Ashwal, 1985, pp. 133-134).

Overall, the theory still needs stronger support through more controlled experimental studies. Yet the idea that frustration and displaced aggression may be a general cause of prejudice remains acceptable.

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2. Cognitive Categorization

This approach focuses on how ordinary cognitive processes may contribute to the development of prejudiced attitudes. It assumes that prejudice may arise, at least in part, from basic aspects of social cognition. These aspects include the ways we think about others, organize information about them, and use that information to form social judgments. This issue has been central to research on prejudice during the past decade. Nearly 1,500 studies have shown that prejudice does not arise only from social conditioning. Nor does it arise only because individuals displace or project their aggression onto others. It may also result from basic cognitive processes that we use to simplify, organize, and give meaning to our social environments. In other words, it may result from social categorization, through which we organize the world by placing objects, things, and people into groups or categories (Myers, 1996, p. 417).

These categorization processes lead to the emergence of stereotypes. Stereotypes provide the necessary basis for prejudice, or they reinforce it, as Daniel Goleman states (2000, p. 226). Several studies have supported this assumption, including the following:

(Join, 1991; Haddock, 1991; Anna, 1997; Frederick & Gregory, 1997; Jo-Anna, 1998; Rebecca, 1998).

How do stereotypes work? Stereotyping and classifying individuals into groups appear to create distance. Studies show that members of the ingroup often focus on similarities among themselves. This is called the assumed similarity effect. At the same time, they focus on their differences from the outgroup (Taylor et al., 1997, pp. 188-189). One effect of stereotyping is that the group closes in on itself and exaggerates the differences between itself and other groups. Instead of searching for similarities, it looks mainly for differences.

Stereotypes also affect the organization, interpretation, and recall of information about other groups. This does not support positive communication between groups. Studies indicate that once a stereotype is activated, the traits believed to describe members of the outgroup come easily to mind. This may happen even when the individual has no direct experience with members of that group. Stereotypes also lead people to attend only to certain types of information, usually the information that confirms the stereotype. If available information does not fit the stereotype, it may be distorted or simply denied (cited in Baron et al., 1998, pp. 127, 134-135).

In sum, stereotypes exert strong effects on our thinking about others. They create biases in the way we process social knowledge about other groups. Through selective attention to information that confirms the stereotype, the stereotype resists change (Franzoi, 1996, p. 390). Thus, stereotyping produces cognitive bias and perceptual distortion in intergroup relations. These biases appear in the selective processing of information. They help stabilize and maintain stereotypes within what may be called a closed cognitive loop.

Research has also identified several cognitive mechanisms that seem to arise directly from social categorization. These mechanisms are assumed to contribute to the formation of stereotypes and then to prejudice. Once we classify people into groups, we tend to perceive members of the outgroup as similar to one another. We overlook differences among them. This is known as the illusion of outgroup homogeneity.

By contrast, the distinctiveness of the ingroup is emphasized. We tend to see members of our own group as more varied. This tendency to perceive greater differentiation among members of our group

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than among members of the outgroup may reflect the fact that we have limited experience with other groups and closer contact with our own ingroup (Baron et al., op. cit., pp. 137-138). If we see members of the outgroup as more similar to one another, we also see them as different from us. Since we are attracted to those who resemble us and tend to avoid those whom we believe to be different, the logical result is ingroup bias (Myers, op. cit., p. 418).

Studies also show that when a distinctive event is committed by a person belonging to a distinctive minority group, it attracts the attention of the majority group. It helps create an illusory correlation between that act and the minority as a whole. In reality, this correlation may be weak or may not exist at all (ibid., pp. 422-423). This illusory correlation explains the tendency to overestimate the rate of negative behaviors among relatively small groups. Baron and colleagues note that such illusory correlations, when they occur, have important implications for prejudice. They explain why members of majority groups often attribute negative tendencies and attitudes to different minority groups. An example is when White Americans overestimate crime rates among African Americans (Baron et al., op. cit., p. 136).

Duckitt (2000, pp. 172-173) raises an important question: Can the stereotype, as a purely cognitive process, explain the human readiness for prejudice? He answers that stereotyping, in the evaluative sense, is generally accepted as a common human process. It is also accepted that the negative stereotype is the determinant of prejudiced attitudes. Yet there are important reasons for judging that stereotypes, as a specific cognitive process, cannot solve this issue effectively. One reason is that stereotypes, as perceptual distortions shaped by cognitive processes, should be evaluatively neutral.

Stereotyping, as a cognitive process, should not determine or influence the content of the stereotype. The only factor that produces the illusory associations that form stereotypes is a set of very special and unusual conditions. Stereotyping, as a purely cognitive and perceptual process, highlights actual differences between social categories, regardless of whether these differences are positive, negative, or neutral. These actual differences are shaped by social conditions. When cognitive processes produce negative stereotypes about specific social categories, they contribute to the formation of prejudiced attitudes against members of those categories. It is therefore reasonable to say that the actual cause of prejudice lies in the social conditions that create real differences and inequality among people. In this case, stereotypes are the mechanism that translates social grievances into prejudice. Duckitt therefore emphasizes that stereotyping as a cognitive process does not explain prejudice by itself. What matters is its content. That content is determined mainly by the social position of different categories and groups, a position shaped by the culture of society. Stereotyping, as a cognitive mechanism, reflects the differences between groups as defined by the traditional culture of the community.

Other studies, however, have shown that social categorization may have consequences other than stereotypes. These consequences may be responsible for prejudiced attitudes between groups. Once the social world is divided, as it often is, into “us” and “them,” that is, into an ingroup and an outgroup, we tend to see members of “us” more positively than members of “them,” whom we perceive more negatively. This was shown in the work of Henri Tajfel and colleagues (1971). They found that mere group membership is sufficient to explain the emergence of ingroup bias and prejudice against the outgroup, even in the absence of actual competition. To support this assumption, Tajfel and his colleagues introduced what they called minimal groups, which involve only a minimal degree of

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interaction. The results showed that seeing oneself as a member of a group creates bias in favor of that group. Later studies following Tajfel's work showed that group membership can evoke different forms of ingroup bias. This appeared when individuals evaluated the performance of people from their own group and people from another group who performed the same tasks. It also appeared in selective recall of positive behaviors by ingroup members and negative behaviors by outgroup members. It further appeared in selective forgetting of negative behavior among ingroup members and positive behavior among outgroup members. It was reflected as well in differences in reward given to members of the two groups, and in the evaluation of ingroup and outgroup traits in favor of the ingroup (Brewer & Silver, 1978).

The foregoing shows the importance of social categorization in understanding prejudice. It creates cognitive bias that can explain ingroup favoritism and prejudice against the outgroup. However, some scholars object that the effect of categorization cannot be explained fully on the basis of purely cognitive processes.

Affective factors cannot be ignored. Classifying individuals into groups activates basic motivational processes. These processes seem to reflect a general human tendency to value the ingroup positively. This may represent a basic human need for self-esteem, which leads to ingroup bias. The most important attempt to highlight these motivational factors is social identity theory, as developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Tajfel (1982).

3. Relative Deprivation

The theory of relative deprivation, associated with Runciman and Gurr (Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970), is among the most important theories used by political scholars to explain extremism and violence. It can also shed light on the social dynamics that drive prejudice, especially when we consider the strong overlap between prejudice, extremism, and violence. As Gurr defines it, relative deprivation means a contradiction between people's expectations about things and the living conditions they believe they deserve, on the one hand, and the capacities of their social environment, on the other. It is a negative gap between legitimate expectations and actual reality. This gap creates what may be called a frustrating situation for a large number of individuals in society. In this situation, people face material or psychological obstacles that prevent them from obtaining or keeping certain values. They are also aware of the forces behind this interference and obstruction. This awareness may push them toward violence as a way to overcome the situation (cited in Mohamed Ibrahim Al-Desouki, 1992, p. 30).

Relative deprivation therefore arises from perceiving a contradiction between what a person has and what he or she believes he or she deserves. Comparison plays a major role here. The individual recognizes this contradiction by comparing himself or herself with other groups. When members of a group perceive that they are relatively deprived in comparison with other groups, they express dissatisfaction and resentment as hostility toward the groups used as points of comparison. For example, in a rapidly growing economy, the economic conditions of most people may improve. Yet feelings of relative deprivation may arise among those whose conditions improve very slowly. They see other groups achieving greater gains. This creates feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment, which may be expressed as hostility toward more advantaged groups. A real example can be found in the riots by Black Americans in the United States during the 1960s. Despite general economic improvement, Black Americans felt that their conditions remained worse than those of White Americans. Analyses

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indicate that this contributed to feelings of hatred and violence against Whites (Taylor et al., 1997, p. 183).

The theory thus shows how social conditions interact with psychological factors in the emergence of prejudice. It links deprivation as a social factor to psychological factors through the concepts of anger and resentment, which are likely to lead to prejudice. Again, when comparisons show that some groups enjoy unjustified special advantages, deprived groups may feel sufficiently motivated to bring about social change. These attempts to restore balance may become violent. Gurr (1970) linked the level of relative deprivation in thirteen countries with a list of social disturbances drawn from archival sources. As expected, the correlation was positive. Groups that suffered more deprivation were more rebellious and violent (Hewstone et al., 1993, p. 407). Many other studies showed that social violence practiced by different social groups is related to the levels of relative deprivation suffered by these groups (cited in Argyle & Colman, 1995, p. 66).

In Egypt, this assumption was confirmed in more than one study. Research by the National Center for Social and Criminological Research on cases of mass violence during 1973-1974 showed that most participants in these cases were poor (Qadri Hefni et al., 1976). Mahmoud Abu El-Neel's study (1977) on the youth events of January 17-18, 1977, showed that the violence in which these youths participated reflected frustration caused by the failure to satisfy many of their needs under stressful social and economic conditions. Similar findings appeared in Azza Abdel-Ghani Hegazy's study (1986) of incidents of collective violence from 1977 to 1986, and in Abdel-Hamid Safwat Ibrahim's study (1990) of the Ain Shams riots of August 12-13, 1988. These studies revealed the role of status inconsistency and awareness of relative deprivation.

However, two types of relative deprivation must be distinguished, as Runciman (1966) explained. This distinction has often been neglected in studies that examine the relationship between relative deprivation and prejudiced attitudes.

Egoistic deprivation: This is the individual's feeling that he or she is relatively deprived compared with other individuals.

Fraternal deprivation: This is a group's feeling that it is relatively deprived compared with other groups, whether or not its members feel deprived at the personal level.

Egoistic deprivation therefore arises when the individual compares himself or herself with similar individuals. Fraternal deprivation arises from comparisons between groups (Taylor et al., op. cit., p. 184).

Evidence indicates that fraternal deprivation is more common and more effective in provoking hostility between groups and social protest. Egoistic deprivation plays only a minor role, and in many cases it plays no role at all (ibid., p. 184).

Second: The Sociological Approach to the Interpretation of Prejudice and Hate Speech:

The previous section presented the basic psychological processes through which the latent human readiness for prejudice appears to be formed. Yet these processes do not work automatically or inevitably. Social conditions are necessary to crystallize, organize, and direct them. In other words, these processes become active and produce prejudice only under certain factors in the social environment. This is what is meant by the social dynamics of prejudice. The social nature of prejudice

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is supported by the fact that social groups tend to be marked by normative or social patterns of prejudice. Thus, the prejudiced attitudes adopted by an individual against a certain group can be traced to the group to which that individual belongs (Clifford & Lynne, 1997). In this case, prejudice becomes a shared group norm. The group adopts it, and its members comply with it under group pressure and the need for conformity.

This part will present four main perspectives suggested by the theoretical and research literature on prejudice and hate speech: realistic intergroup conflict, social identity, exploitation theory, and institutional discrimination.

1. Realistic Intergroup Conflict

This theory assumes that conflict between groups over interests and material or natural resources can arouse mutual prejudiced attitudes. It is one of the oldest approaches proposed to explain prejudice. Each category or group has interests and conditions that may conflict with the interests or conditions of other categories and groups. The pursuit of goals by one group may therefore represent a direct threat to another group pursuing the same goals. As LeVine and Campbell (1972, p. 35) argue, each group views the other as a source of threat.

This threat produces two changes inside each group. The first is increased hostility toward the outgroup. The second is stronger loyalty to the ingroup and greater cohesion among its members. As a result, each group distances itself from the other and regards the other as an obstacle to the achievement of its interests. Prejudice and hostility are expected outcomes of conflict over material resources because economic needs press for satisfaction. Such satisfaction is also associated with recognition, status, and influence. If prejudice arises from group conflict over natural resources, it can be reduced when all groups are adequately satisfied. This is not always possible. Since conflicts of interest and conflicting goals cannot always be avoided, prejudice may remain a problem that is often difficult to solve.

In general, the view that prejudice is the outcome of realistic intergroup conflict was supported by the classic work of the social psychologist Muzafer Sherif and colleagues (Sherif et al., 1961). Specialists regard this work as the main representative of this approach to the interpretation of prejudice. It included three field experiments that provided strong evidence for the validity of the approach. The sample consisted of twenty-two eleven-year-old boys from a large community in Oklahoma. They were invited to spend three weeks in a special summer camp. The boys did not know one another before the experiment. They were selected because they were well-adjusted, intelligent, and from comfortable middle-class families. The camp site was ideal for each stage of the study. For example, it was large enough to divide the twenty-two boys into two separate groups, each with its own facilities and sports activities. The two groups were far enough apart to prevent direct contact.

- The first stage required the parallel development of two distinct and cohesive groups. It lasted one week. By the end of this stage, two strong psychological groups had emerged in the two camps. Cooperation prevailed within each group. Each group had a clear group structure, marked by an organization of statuses and norms and by specific group feelings.
- The second stage brought the two groups together in competitive activities. One of its main results was the strong arousal of hostility between them, accompanied by increased solidarity within each group.

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• In the final stage, strategies were introduced that created situations requiring cooperation to achieve goals necessary for both groups. By the end of this stage, a larger group had formed and replaced the two previous groups (Lambert & Lambert, 1993, pp. 206-207).

This study showed that competition and conflict can create hatred and hostility between groups. It also showed, on the other hand, that common group goals can lead to cooperation and positive intergroup attitudes.

From this classic study and the studies that later supported it, researchers derive explanatory principles that they regard as reasonably general. These principles assume that the basic social dynamics of prejudice are similar in small face-to-face groups and in larger socio-cultural groups (Duckitt, 2000, p. 185). In other words, the relations of competition and conflict between small groups, and the results that follow from them, may be seen as a small-scale model that closely resembles conflicts of interest and power at the broader social level.

2. Social Identity Theory

When we classify the social world into different groups, we tend to identify with a group whose members share with us a sense of belonging and a common identity. This is the group of "us." Our social identity derives from being members of this "us," or, in common terms, from being members of an ingroup. The idea that our social identity is determined by our membership or social affiliations has a long history, as shown in Mead's work (1934) (Hewstone et al., 1993, p. 400). It also has important implications for intergroup behavior. Our sense of who we are, or our self-concept, does not depend only on our personal identity. It also depends on our social identity. We therefore tend to see our ingroup positively in an attempt to form and maintain positive self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

More specifically, social identity theory is based on three main assumptions:

People classify the social world into ingroups and outgroups.

People acquire a sense of self-esteem from their social identity as members of an ingroup.

People's concepts of themselves depend partly on how they evaluate their ingroup in relation to other groups. Accordingly, the theory expects individuals to support their self-esteem through identification with social groups. These efforts succeed only to the extent that individuals perceive their group as superior to other groups. Since all individuals have the same tendencies, the final outcome is that each group seeks to see itself as better than its competitors. Prejudice arises from the clash of these social perceptions, that is, from the clash between each group's perception of itself as the best (Tajfel, 1982). In other words, if the individual's desire for positive self-esteem is basic, and if this depends partly on how the individual sees his or her group, then the individual will try to view that group as positively as possible. This is achieved through continuous comparison with other groups. The individual usually seeks to end this comparison in favor of his or her own group. Tajfel and Turner (op. cit.) assume that we evaluate the worth and status of our group by comparing it with other groups. The outcome of intergroup comparison is crucial because it indirectly contributes to our self-esteem. If our group can be perceived as superior, we will enjoy this superiority, and this may create bias. This was shown by Crocker and colleagues (1987). The need for a positive social identity creates a competitive orientation toward other groups, and this can bias perception. Members of a group may distort information in order to maintain a positive image of their group. Many other studies have concluded that the need for a positive self-concept produces bias when we compare our group with other groups. This includes

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searching only for the image in which our group appears best, focusing on differences only when they favor our group, and ignoring differences that may favor the outgroup (cited in Hewstone et al., op. cit., p. 400).

If ingroup bias is motivated by the need to support self-esteem, then prejudice against outgroups may also be stronger. This expectation was confirmed in several studies, including those of Wills (1981) and Wylie (1979). They found that individuals with low personal self-esteem expressed more prejudiced attitudes against outgroups. They explained this by arguing that individuals with low self-esteem need ego support, which can be achieved through social comparisons that strengthen the self-image. Since personal self-esteem and collective self-esteem are positively related (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), low collective self-esteem also appears to be related to negative attitudes against the outgroup. Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) confirmed this finding. They found that people with low collective self-esteem were more likely to exaggerate evaluations of their own group and downgrade the outgroup. They explained this by arguing that overvaluing the ingroup and devaluing the outgroup can raise self-esteem. This was also confirmed by Chin and McClintock (1993), who showed that discrimination against outgroup members can support collective self-esteem.

Because the theory assumes that social identity forms a central aspect of self-definition, and that self-esteem is partly determined by the social evaluation of the ingroup, we can enjoy the success of our group, or even the personal success of some of its members. Many studies have shown that the successes of the group to which the individual belongs can raise the self-esteem of each member of that group (cited in Franzoi, 1996, p. 399). Similarly, studies confirm that external threats to one's group may increase ingroup bias, because bias in this case serves the self (cited in Taylor et al., 1997, p. 190). When the social value of our group is threatened, we may become more biased in order to maintain a positive social identity. We are likely to respond with prejudice to dangers or threats coming from outgroups (Crocker & Luhtanen, op. cit.). Although most studies are consistent with the theory's assumptions, other studies do not confirm its expectations. For example, some studies found no relationship between the strength of individuals' identification with their group and their levels of bias toward that group (Ahmed Zayed, 1998, p. 71). Other studies indicate that an individual may evaluate his or her group negatively and show greater bias toward the outgroup. Some individuals may even identify with a group other than their own (Itesh & Richard, 1987; Maykel, 1973). With regard to the self-esteem hypothesis, Maykel and Kees (1995) found that low personal and collective self-esteem was related to prejudice only among minority groups. Among majority groups, prejudice was positively related to both personal and collective self-esteem. This directly contradicts the theory's prediction.

Other studies confirm that individuals with high collective self-esteem were more biased toward their group than those with low collective self-esteem. Some researchers also found that individuals with low self-esteem expressed negative attitudes not only against outgroups but also against their own group. These studies conclude that low self-esteem does not always drive intergroup prejudice (cited in Taylor et al., op. cit., p. 191). Overall, most findings support the theory. When certain studies do not predict or appear inconsistent with its assumptions, they can still be reinterpreted, as some scholars argue (Duckitt, 2000, p. 179). It is therefore difficult at this stage to provide a final evaluation of the theory or of its overall performance. It should also be noted that this discussion has been limited to the

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main assumptions of the theory. The theory is broad and complex. Within the limits of this article, it is not possible to present all of its assumptions and the research findings related to them.

3. Unequal Power (Status) between Groups (Exploitation Theory)

Unequal Power (Status) & Exploitation

Many prejudiced attitudes reflect long and deep conflicts between groups. In such cases, understanding intergroup prejudice requires attention to the history of relations between groups. This historical approach argues that prejudiced attitudes often arise as a justification for the exploitation and oppression practiced by stronger groups against weaker groups (Franzoi, 1996, p. 393). Historians have discussed the forces that create status differences between groups. What concerns us here is that once these status differences exist, prejudice helps justify superiority. It also serves the interests of those who possess wealth and power (Myers, 1996, p. 402). This view may be considered complementary to realistic conflict theory. Conflict between groups often ends with the domination of one group. The victorious group then seeks to consolidate its control and extend its economic and social influence. This is often accompanied by contempt for the defeated group and by viewing it as inferior. The dominant group uses this as a device to justify its domination and exploitation. As Arnold Rose (1971, p. 29) argues, negative attitudes and inferior views in this case create an excuse and a justification for different forms of exploitation and domination. According to this view, prejudice is a manifestation of human exploitation of other humans. It is an ideology that gives logic and legitimacy to injustice against groups whose rights have been taken and whose energies are exploited for the benefit of dominant groups.

The dominant group instills in its members a feeling of superiority. It also promotes the belief that the advantages and gains they enjoy are acquired rights that should not be surrendered, and that others must work to serve their interests. This leads them to form stereotypes that place others in a lower position. These stereotypes justify the superior position and help maintain it. For example, some White Americans have viewed Black people as lazy, unserious, and limited in intelligence. Such a view strengthens the feeling of superiority and justifies the privileged status enjoyed by Whites. It also makes any attempt to establish equality appear irrelevant. Similarly, stereotypes adopted by men about women have helped justify women's lower status and legitimize men's privileged position. Men are presented as more intelligent, more rational, more civilized, and more capable of leadership, while women are presented as less intelligent, more emotional, more primitive, and naturally dependent. It is clear that this view remains one of the main obstacles to women's liberation.

Slavery may be the clearest example of relations of domination and exploitation in history. It also provides clear evidence of the function of prejudice as a justification for an unjust situation between groups. The master sees the slave as naturally inferior: lazy, irresponsible, mentally deficient, and lacking ambition. These alleged qualities are then used to justify enslavement. We may also recall how European writers and politicians in the nineteenth century justified colonial expansion by describing colonized peoples as inferior races in need of protection and civilization under the so-called "white man's burden." In American history, racist claims were used to justify the enslavement and exploitation of Black victims, especially in the southern states.

A number of practical experiments have shown that developing prejudiced and dehumanizing attitudes toward victims of harmful acts committed by a person appears to be a common response. By stripping

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victims of human qualities, treating them as subhuman, and degrading them, exploiters can avoid seeing themselves as villains. They can also justify further exploitative behavior (cited in Franzoi, op. cit., p. 394).

It is worth noting that the conditions of the exploited group may appear to justify the prejudiced attitudes that the exploiting group directs toward it. Yet dialectical thinking can move beyond this superficial appearance and reveal the real complexity of the relation of prejudice. The conditions of the exploited group are not the cause of prejudice against it. Rather, they are first a result of that prejudice. They are produced by the exploiting group. Fouad Zakaria (1971, p. 5) gives an example: the practice of prejudice increases the deterioration of the group against which prejudice is practiced. In this way, the elements of the dialectical movement in the relation of prejudice are completed. The one who practices oppression works, consciously or unconsciously, to keep the oppressed in a condition that makes them seem worthy of oppression. The longer and more intense the oppression becomes, the greater the deterioration that justifies it and creates its standards. The distance and polarization between the two sides of the relation of prejudice also increase.

In evaluating exploitation theory, scholars note that, despite its plausibility and the many real examples that may support it, the available experimental evidence remains limited. It does not provide decisive proof of the theory's validity. This may be due to clear practical difficulties in designing and conducting such research. For this reason, a final evaluation of the theory cannot be made (Duckitt, 2000, pp. 192-193).

But what about the response of exploited groups to exploitation and oppression?

It may be expected that the more a group feels exploited for the benefit of another group, the greater its prejudice and hostility toward that exploiting group. If the exploiter resorts to prejudice as a defense of privileged status, prejudice among the exploited is a function of their perception of their lower status. In other words, it is a function of their awareness of the wide gap between their position and the position of the exploiter. Philippe Burnot (1985, p. 139) argues that exploitation and oppression may be sufficient causes of prejudice and violence. When people feel that their humanity has been taken from them, that they are deprived of their legitimate rights, and that their energies are exploited for the benefit of powerful groups, prejudice and hostility toward those groups spread among them. They may become convinced that violence is the way to change these conditions and restore the lost balance. This view was supported by Thibaut's field study. Two status levels were created among boys, one with greater authority and prestige and the other with less. The results showed that these conditions generated a high degree of hostility from the lower-status group toward the higher-status group (Adel Ezz El-Din Al-Ashwal, 1985, p. 125).

However, prejudice and hostility among exploited groups as a response to exploitation and oppression do not always occur. In some cases, the opposite may happen. The exploited group may accept its position and believe in its inferiority. It may even reject itself and prefer dominant groups. For example, Milner's study (1973) of Black children in Britain showed that 24% of them did not identify with their own group but identified with other groups. Itesh and Richard (1987) also showed that members of low-status groups were more biased toward outgroups. This finding had been confirmed much earlier in two classic studies. Clark (1947) found that rejecting the ingroup and preferring the outgroup often occurred among Black American children, who often faced great difficulty accepting their skin color

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(Salwa Abdel-Baqi, 1992, pp. 209-210). Mary Goodman (1952) reached a similar conclusion. The self-image of Black children resembled the image Whites held of them. They believed that they differed from Whites and were dirtier, which reflected a real feeling of inferiority (Mohamed Shehata Rabie, 1977, pp. 199-200).

Acceptance of inferiority and self-rejection appear to contradict the functional nature of the group, because they lead to helplessness and withdrawal. Yet this contradiction is only apparent. These feelings may be necessary for adaptation to an oppressed situation. Duckitt (op. cit., p. 196) notes that, under certain conditions, such feelings become highly useful. This occurs when the oppressive system cannot realistically be changed, or when the oppressed group is too weak to liberate itself. In such conditions, self-punitive responses ensure passive recognition of injustice instead of actions that may provoke harsher repression or even policies of extermination. In this situation, self-punishment may have a vital value for the oppressed group.

An important question remains: What determines the nature of the oppressed group's response? When does the group become "silent," accepting its inferior status and punishing itself as responsible for its current situation? And when does it rebel and resort to violence against the system of exploitation?

Duckitt (op. cit., p. 197) assumes that submissive response depends on whether the oppressed group sees the existing distribution of power and status among groups as stable and legitimate. If this view changes and the situation is seen as unstable and illegitimate, the response of the oppressed group changes. It moves from acceptance of inferiority and self-blame to violence and revolution against the exploiter.

What produces this shift in perception? It is the real historical changes in the balance of power between groups. These changes lead to what Denisoff (1982, pp. 41-43) calls revolutionary violence. Violence then becomes the tool through which the oppressed group wins and tears apart the system of exploitation. When the status of the exploiting group is threatened, it may, as Denisoff (p. 29) assumes, resort to more counter-violence to protect its interests and defend the relations of production on which its economic and political capacities are based. If, however, it believes that the oppressed group has become strong enough to win the conflict, it resorts to what Duckitt (p. 198) calls a policy of appeasement. In this case, attitudes of apparent tolerance prevail. These attitudes are linked to a different type of prejudice known as symbolic racism, or sometimes modern racial prejudice, as seen in American society.

4. Institutional Discrimination

The discriminatory policy adopted by official institutions in dealing with different social groups affects contact and interaction among these groups. It can create normative patterns of prejudice within them. Discriminatory policy means differentiating between individuals and groups according to lineage, race, ethnicity, belief, or other criteria in rights and duties within one society. This involves inequality and a lack of fairness and objectivity in treatment (Jaber Abdel-Hamid & Alaa El-Din Kafafi, 1995, pp. 3149, 3598). Discrimination is generally divided into four main categories: discrimination in economic relations, discrimination in legal transactions and rights, discrimination in political matters, and discrimination in social relations. These forms of institutional discrimination are basically expressions of power relations in society (Mohamed Al-Jawhari, 1971, p. 24). In such a contradictory society, the basic function of state authority is to protect and strengthen the political and economic influence of the

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dominant and exploiting classes. It also protects their privileges against the actions of the oppressed and crushed class. In other words, the main activity of state authority in this case is to guard the interests of the dominant class by adopting policies of social discrimination (Denisoff, 1982, pp. 24-25).

Scholars have stressed that discriminatory policies practiced by official authorities do not merely arouse prejudiced attitudes between privileged and non-privileged groups. They also support the survival and continuity of these attitudes (Goleman, 2000, pp. 222-229; Myers, 1996, p. 410).

Other research has emphasized the great importance of approaches that involve changing institutional culture and creating an environment free from discrimination in order to reduce and prevent prejudice (Louise et al., 1989; Sharon & John, 1996).

Conflicts that arise between social groups of unequal status, and that often take the form of open armed clashes, will not disappear unless class inequality and social contradictions are eliminated (Denisoff, op. cit., p. 29). There is also good evidence that a strong commitment by institutional authorities to fair and non-discriminatory treatment of groups was an important determinant of positive change in intergroup attitudes in situations of contact (Duckitt, 2000, p. 212).

How does discriminatory policy contribute to the creation of prejudiced attitudes between groups? Institutional discrimination confronts different groups by creating social distances and barriers between them. This reduces the possibility of their meeting and increases their focus on differences and distinctions. At the same time, it arouses group biases. This conclusion is supported by Tajfel and colleagues (1971). They found that the mere act of randomly dividing individuals into groups by the experimenter aroused ingroup bias and prejudice against outgroups. The role of the experimenter can be compared with the role of official institutions that separate groups. Similar results may therefore be expected from such separation.

Institutional discrimination creates social distance between groups. It also creates psychological distance. This psychological and social distance becomes fertile ground for the emergence and continuation of mutual prejudiced attitudes. Even when official institutions change their discriminatory policies, their effects, once settled in collective consciousness, are not easily erased. This process may take a long time (Beverly, 1993; Goleman, op. cit., p. 229).

Some scholars assume that the main problem is that a society that adopts discrimination creates patterns of contact between privileged and non-privileged groups that usually produce mutual prejudice. The declared goal of discriminatory policy, as expressed by the architects of apartheid in South Africa, which can be taken as a major model, was to reduce contact between differentiated groups to the minimum so that conflicts would disappear and peace and civilization would prevail. Apart from the falsity of this logic, this is not what happens in any discriminatory society. The only contacts that are prevented are those based on equal status and personal contact requiring cooperation to achieve common goals. The contacts that are permitted and encouraged are those based on unequal status, superficial relations, and the absence of mutual cooperation (Duckitt, op. cit., pp. 215-216). Experimental evidence shows that these patterns of intergroup contact arouse and support prejudice (Adel Ezz El-Din Al-Ashwal, 1985, pp. 143-157; Davidoff, 1980, pp. 785-786). This demonstrates the main contradiction between the declared intentions of discriminatory policy and its possible effects on intergroup attitudes. In other words, it reveals the ideological nature of the pattern of contact reinforced by discriminatory policy.

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We may recall from the discussion of exploitation theory that the response of self-blame and belief in inadequacy among the oppressed group appears when that group perceives relations of power and status as fixed and legitimate. At that point, both the oppressed group and the dominant group accept the oppressed group's lower status and its inability to share power equally with the dominant group. This necessarily requires contact between the two groups to be based on unequal status. If equal-status contact occurs, it undermines the stability and legitimacy of power relations. The oppressed group then begins to rebel and to attempt to change those relations. On the other hand, when the dominant group has equal-status contact with the oppressed group, its prejudice decreases. Its acceptance of the oppressed group's inferiority weakens. Its readiness to accept the use of different instruments of oppression to preserve the existing authoritarian system also decreases. We can therefore conclude that there is a basic logic behind the pattern of contact supported by discriminatory policy. As Duckitt, the South African scholar who experienced this policy closely, emphasizes, the purpose is to preserve and support the legitimacy of the system of domination in the minds of both the oppressed group and the dominant group. In other words, it seeks to maintain the psychological conditions that stabilize the system of oppression and exploitation.

In sum, the previous discussion of social dynamics shows how the social structure can arouse and maintain prejudiced attitudes between groups. It does so through conflicts of interest, through relative deprivation that some groups may feel in comparison with groups that dominate sources of power and status, and through discriminatory policies adopted by official authorities that serve and support those dominant groups. Finally, evidence shows that the prejudiced attitudes adopted by an individual can be traced to the group to which that individual belongs. Prejudice may be a shared group norm defined by the group's relation to other groups and by the features of the social structure in general. In other words, evidence points to prejudice as a collective or social phenomenon. Yet prejudice, as an attitude, remains an individual experience. This raises a crucial question: How is prejudice acquired or transmitted, as a collective and social phenomenon, from the group to its individual members? This will be discussed in the following section.

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(Join, 1991; Haddock, 1991; Anna, 1997; Frederick & Gregory, 1997; Jo-Anna, 1998; Rebecca, 1998).

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